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Abstract – Even with the rapid changes in the level of complexity and the uncertainty of the environment in which
Belgian sea fisheries operate, fisheries management in Belgium is still mainly based on restrictive policy instruments
founded in the biological approach of fisheries management science. Since they will continue to play an important
role, this paper evaluated changes in three restrictive policy instruments and their eﬀect on future fleet performance and
dynamics, i.e. maximum fishing days, total quota-restrictions and licences. These eﬀects are tested through scenarios
in a microeconomic simulation model, including sensitivity analysis. This study opts for a dynamic simulation model
based on a microeconomic approach of fleet dynamics using system dynamics as a modelling technique (operational
base: Vensimr©DSS). The results indicated that changes in maximum fishing days and total quota resulted in higher
fluctuations in fleet performance and dynamics compared to changes in licences. Furthermore, changes in maximum
fishing days and total quota had a direct impact on fleet performance, though not always as expected, whereas licences
only aﬀected fleet performance indirectly since they only limit the entry of new vessels to the fleet and they can
block the growth of successful sub fleets. The outcomes of this study are translated into practical recommendations
for improving fisheries management. Firstly, policy makers need to be more aware of misperceptions of feedback.
Secondly, the results proved that altering only one type of restrictive policy instrument at a time often fails to meet
desired outcomes. Therefore, policy makers need to find a balance in combining policy instruments. Finally, this paper
opens the discussion on the future value of restrictive policy instruments in the rapidly changing, complex and uncertain
fisheries environment. It suggests rethinking their use from “preserving a status quo and social peace” toward a driving
factor in “stimulating fleet dynamics”.
Key words: Fisheries management / Restrictive policy instruments / Sensitivity simulation / System dynamics / Fleet
performance / Fleet dynamics
1 Introduction
Even with the rapid changes in the level of complexity
(Healey and Hennessey 1998; Lane and Stephenson 1999) and
the uncertainty (Charles 1998; Cochrane 1999) of the envi-
ronment in which Belgian sea fisheries operate, fisheries man-
agement in Belgium is still mainly based on restrictive policy
instruments (often imposed by the European Union) founded
in the biological approach of fisheries management science.
Since they will continue to play an important role, this study
a Corresponding author:
Hendrik.Stouten@ilvo.vlaanderen.be
examines their potential future eﬀects on Belgian fleet perfor-
mance and dynamics. Three restrictive policy instruments are
under research: (i) total quota restrictions, (ii) the eﬀort re-
striction of maximum days at sea, and (iii) the limited entry
program of fishing licenses.
Their future eﬀects are analysed through scenarios in a dy-
namic simulation model based on a microeconomic approach
of fleet dynamics and sensitivity analysis. The Belgian sub
fleets are the key agents in the model and their gross operat-
ing profit and fleet size are the key variables of interest. As
a result, the model takes the perspective of sub fleets. The
model consists of four homogeneous sub fleets, three fishing
grounds, one theoretical average species and three restrictive
Article published by EDP Sciences
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Table 1. Key figures of the Belgian fleet illustrating its evolution
between 1950 and 2005.
Average Average
Number of GT per kW per
vessels vessel vessel
1950 457 58 97
1960 415 70 134
1970 332 94 223
1980 208 102 302
1990 201 127 384
1995 155 149 426
2000 131 182 500
2001 132 185 511
2002 129 185 519
2003 125 189 532
2004 121 188 542
2005 119 188 545
Data source: Belgian Sea Fisheries Service.
policy instruments. The value of this research is threefold.
First, it makes policy makers aware of potential future eﬀects
restrictive policy instruments can have on fleet performance
and dynamics. Second, it gives practical suggestions for the fu-
ture use of these restrictive policy instruments and for improv-
ing fisheries management. Finally, it starts the discussion of
the future role restrictive policy instruments can have in man-
aging fleet performance and dynamics.
The paper contains four sections. Section one on materi-
als and methods describes the simulation model consisting of
the main interaction between the Belgian fleet and the restric-
tive policy instruments. Section two contains the results which
clearly indicate diﬀerences in the impact of restrictive policy
instruments on future fleet performance and dynamics. Sec-
tion three discusses the results, gives practical suggestions for
improving fisheries management, and discusses the future role
of restrictive policy instruments, and finally, conclusions are
drawn.
2 Materials and methods
The study uses the Belgian fleet as a case study. This fleet
consists of four important sub fleets: (i) the shrimp trawler
fleet: beam trawlers targeting shrimps (13% of the total fleet in
2005), (ii) the fleet of eurocutters: beam trawlers with an en-
gine power between 200 kW and 221 kW not targeting shrimps
(30% of the total fleet in 2005), (iii) the large beam trawler
fleet: beam trawlers with an engine power higher than 662 kW
not targeting shrimps (44% of the total fleet in 2005), and (iv)
the set netter fleet: vessels using set nets as their main fishing
method (3% of the total fleet in 2005).
The Belgian total fleet declined dramatically between 1950
and 2005 from 457 to 119 vessels, but the average gross
tonnage and engine power for an average vessel has multi-
plied, resulting in a small but quite powerful fleet (Table 1).
This behaviour is mainly due to a dragging “profitability cri-
sis” caused by increasing operational costs and decreasing
catches. As a result, many vessels have exited the fleet or
were reengineered toward more powerful vessels. Neverthe-
less, gross operating profits remained low (Fig. 1) leading to
Fig. 1. The evolution of the average gross operating profits for an
average Belgian vessel per sub fleet between 1997 and 2005 (in euro).
Fig. 2. The evolution of the number of vessels per sub fleet of the
Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2005.
Table 2. Gross operating profit for an average vessel of the Belgian
fishing sub fleet in 2005 (in euro).
N Mean Std. Min Max
deviation
Eurocutter 15 80 584 59 813 −34 562 186 520
Large beam 34 83 087 126 134 −144 220 528 738
trawler
Set netter 3 95 524 95 168 11 979 199 119
Shrimp trawler 8 36 711 46 091 −15 255 112 558
Other 9 107 103 813 −22 712 274 175
525
Total 69 80 894 102 693 −144 220 528 738
small margins to pay oﬀ debts. Table 2 illustrates these low
gross operating profits for an average vessel of the sub fleets
in 2005.
However, it also indicates a huge variability between and
within sub fleets. Consequently, not every vessel in the Belgian
fleet performed insuﬃciently, which is seen in the dynamics of
sub fleets during the last years (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 3. A simplified representation of the system dynamics simulation model not taking into account the arrays (where: “” = stock, “◦” =
converter, “=>” = in- or outflow, and “bold” = decision algorithms).
To evaluate the future performance and dynamics of the
Belgian fleet under restrictive policy instruments, scenarios in
a simulation model will be used (time horizon of 18 years
with a time step (Δt) of a week). This study opts for a dy-
namic simulation model using system dynamics as a modelling
technique (operational base: Vensimr©DSS) (Moxnes 1998a,
1998b, 1999, 2003; Dudley 2003, 2003; Stouten et al. 2007).
The model is based on insights gained from the literature and
from expert group meetings involving fisheries scientists. Ad-
ditionally, informal contacts with the fishing industry and pol-
icy makers have further improved our global understanding of
fisheries management. Based on these insights, decisions were
made concerning the conceptualisation and scope of the simu-
lation model.
This study applies a microeconomic approach to fleet dy-
namics in which restrictive policy instruments (i.e. maximum
fishing days, total quota size and licences) aﬀect tactical and
investment decisions of sub fleets (Mathiesen 2003), resulting
in changes in fleet performance and dynamics. Consequently,
sub fleets are the key agents in the model and gross operating
profit (measured in gross operation profit for an average ves-
sel) and fleet size (measured in number of vessels) of the total
fleet are the key variables of interest. As a result, the model
takes the perspective of sub fleets and unveils their reinforc-
ing investment loop mainly balanced by the three restrictive
policies under research (Fig. 3).
The interactions between these loops cause dynamic com-
plexity (Senge 1990). Gaining insights in how these loops
aﬀect the performance and dynamics of sub fleets when
restrictive policy instruments are altered is vital in meeting
this paper’s objective. Therefore, a comprehensible model is
chosen above a comprehensive model since detailed com-
plexity (Senge 1990) can blur or block our understanding of
dynamic complexity. In line with this principle, four impor-
tant decisions are made. First, the model does not include a
biological component, meaning that stock dynamics are out-
side the scope of the model. Therefore, this model is no stan-
dard bio-economic model. As a result, total quota and catch-
ability are not influenced by biological variables. Second, the
agents in the model are “homo economicus”. This can be justi-
fied since many models concerning fisheries management also
use this “homo economicus” principle (Opaluch and Bockstael
1984). Third, profit generated by the sub fleets can only be in-
vested in a new vessel and there is no external investment in
the fleet. Finally, the size of the arrays in the model needed to
be brief and meaningful (Table 3).
Next, the main economic rules of the model need to be ex-
plained (Fig. 3). The model contains two important decision
rules: a fishing tactical decision rule and an investment deci-
sion rule. The fishing tactical decision rule addresses the sub
fleets’ choice on where to fish. It sends the sub fleet to the fish-
ing ground with the highest catch per unit of eﬀort if fishing is
still possible.
Zsg(t) is defined as a boolean variable that takes the value
one on time t if for sub fleet s: (i) fishing is still an option (see
further for explanation) on fishing ground g and (ii) fishing
ground g is the fishing ground where sub fleet s can catch the
most fish per unit of eﬀort. Zsg(t) is zero for all other situations.
Let Pfish(t) be the fish price on time t which is given,
ndays,s(t) the number of fishing days left on time t for sub fleet
s, Qg the amount of total quota left for fishing ground g and
csg(t) the catch rate for a given (s, g) on time t. The model
selects cS G(t) as the maximal catch rate on time t for (S ,G).
Zsg(t) = Pfish(t) and ndays,s(t) and QG(t) > 0 and csg(t) = cS G(t).
(1)
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Table 3. The sizes of the arrays in the simulation model.
Simulation model Reality Justification
Three restrictive Five main restrictive policy From the five main restrictive policy instruments at hand in Belgium (maximum fishing
policy instruments instruments days, total quota, licences, closed seasons and closed areas), only three policy
instruments (maximum fishing days, total quota and licences) are the focus of this
paper. Therefore, only these three are taken into account in the model. The eﬀects of
other policy instruments are set to zero.
Four sub fleets Four main sub fleets This study distinguishes four sub fleets in the Belgian fleet based on vessel length,
fishing method and target species:
1) the fleet of eurocutters, 2) the large beam trawler fleet, 3) the set netter fleet and
4) the shrimp trawler fleet. Consequently, our simulation model contains four
homogeneous sub fleets.
Six fishing grounds Ten main fishing grounds This simulation model aggregates the six fishing grounds (ICES areas) that contain most
(aggregated into three of the Belgian total quota into three fishing grounds:
fishing grounds) 1) IVbc, 2) VIIde, and 3) VIIfg.
Therefore, this simulation model underestimates the total amount of Belgian quota.
One theoretical Four important target As a result of choosing comprehensibility above comprehensiveness, the simulation
average species species model runs with one theoretical average species.
In equation (1), the number of fishing days left on time t for
sub fleet s is (with ΔT = 52Δt or one year):
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ndays,s(t) = n0days,snvessel s(t) for t = nΔT (n ∈ Z)
ndays,s(t) = max
{
ndays,s(t − Δt) − Zsgndays,snvessel,sΔt, 0
}
for t = nΔt  mΔt (n,m ∈ Z).
(2)
Where n0days,s is the initial number of fishing days for sub fleet
s, ndays,s is the number of days at sea in a week (in a Δt) for sub
fleet s, nvessel,s and is the number of vessels for sub fleet s on
time t.
In equation (1), the amount of total quota left for fishing
ground g is given by (with ΔT = 52Δt or one year):
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Qg(t) = Q0g for t = nΔt (n ∈ Z)
Qg(t) = max
{
Qg(t − Δt) − csg nvessel,s ZsgΔt, 0
}
for t = nΔt  mΔt (n,m ∈ Z).
(3)
Where Q0g is the initial amount of quota for fishing ground g.
The fishing tactical decision rule (Eq. (1)) determines Gs(t)
which is the average gross operating profit for an average ves-
sel for sub fleet s on time t.
Gs(t) = Rs(t) − OCs(t)
nvessel,s(t)
. (4)
Where Rs(t) is revenue for sub fleet s on time t and OCs(t) is
operational cost for sub fleet s on time t.
The revenue for a sub fleet s on time t is:
Rs(t) = nvessel,s(t) Pfish(t)
∑
g
csg(t)Zsg(t). (5)
In equation (4), the operational cost for sub fleet s on time t is:
OCs(t)
∑
g
(
VCsg(t) + TrCsg(t)
)
Zsg(t). (6)
Where VCsg(t) is the variable cost for sub fleet s for fishing
ground g on time t and is given. The travelling cost SCsg(t) is
not given and can be calculated from:
TrCsg(t) = 2dgUs nvessel,s(t) Pfish(t). (7)
Where dg is the distance to the fishing ground g, Us is the
given fuel consumption per kilometer for an average vessel of
sub fleet s and Pfuel is the fuel price for a litre fuel on time t.
Additionally, the fishing tactical decision rule influences
the investment decision rule through influencing the financial
power of a sub fleet. The financial power of a sub fleet s on
time t is measured in savings of a sub fleet s on time t.
S s(t) = S s(t − Δt) + Es(t) − lfin,s(t). (8)
Where S s(t) is the savings of a sub fleet s on time t, Es is
earnings for sub fleet s, Ifin,s(t) is the financial result of the
investment decision for sub fleet s on time t.
In equation (8), earnings for sub fleet s on time t are:
Es(t) = Rs(t) − (FCs(t) + OCs(t) + Rdebt,s(t)). (9)
Where FCs(t) is fixed costs for sub fleet s on time t and
Rdebt,s(t) is the relay of debt for sub fleet s on time t which
is a fixed fraction of the total debts of sub fleet s on time t.
In equation (8), Ifin,s(t) depends on the outcome of the in-
vestment decision on time t. The investment decision contains
three options: (i) investment in a new vessel, (ii) demolition
of a vessel, and (iii) neither. Ii,s(t) is the boolean variable that
takes the value one on time t if for sub fleet s: (i) the num-
ber of licences left is strictly positive, (ii) the sum of money
from the savings and the possible bank loan does not exceed a
threshold value, and (iii) the remaining debts are not exceeding
a threshold value. Ii,s(t) is zero for all other situations.
Let nlic(t) be the number of licences left for the total fleet
on time t, Ls(t) is the possible bank loan for sub fleet s on time
t, Ds(t) is the amount of debts for sub fleet s on time t, θS ,L the
threshold value for S s(t) + Ls(t) and θD the threshold value for
Ds(t).
Ii,s(t) = (nlic(t) > 0 and S s(t) + Ls(t)θS ,L and Ds(t) < θD (10)
Id,s(t) is then the boolean variable that takes the value one on
time t if for sub fleet s: (i) the sum of money from the savings
and the possible bank loan is negative and (ii) the number of
H. Stouten et al.: Aquat. Living Resour. 21, 247–258 (2008) 251
vessels is strictly positive. Id,s(t) is zero for all other situations.
Id,s(t) = (S s(t) ≤ 0 and nvessel,s(t) > 0). (11)
In equation (8), Ifin,s(t) for sub fleet s on time t can now be
written as:
Ifin,s(t) = (Ii,s(t)Pnewves,s(t))) − (Id,s(t)Pdemoves,s(t)). (12)
Where Pnewves,s(t) is the price of a new vessel for sub fleet s on
time t and Pdemoves,s is the money sub fleet s gets from the de-
molition of a vessel which is a demolition price, theoretically
speaking.
The number of vessels in sub fleet s on time t is then
given by:
nvessel,s(t) = nvessel,s(t − Δt) + Ii,s(t) + Id,s(t). (13)
The scenarios (Table 4) used to test the eﬀect of restrictive
policy instruments on the performance and dynamics of the
Belgian fleet are based either on univariate or multivariate sen-
sitivity simulations (Monte Carlo simulation). Each scenario
has a time horizon of 18 years (936 weeks, from January 1,
1997, till December 31, 2014) with a time step (Δt) of a week.
The first nine years show the fit between the simulated data
and the historical data (reference mode). From 2005 on, the
simulated data from the scenarios gives insights to the future
behaviour of the fleet performance and dynamics till the year
2015.
To run the simulation model with its sensitivity simula-
tions, data was collected from individual vessels on catch
composition, eﬀort allocation and financial situation for the
years 1997 through 2005 (see Appendix). These data were
compiled from two institutes. There is a very useful database
called “Belsamp” hosted at the biological section of the In-
stitute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research containing de-
tailed data per individual vessel on catch composition and ef-
fort allocation. For financial data on an individual vessel level,
the Belgian Sea Fishery Service of the Flemish government
was addressed. They collect financial data for the Belgian sea
fisheries fleet through a survey (on a voluntary annual basis,
sample of approximately 50% of the fleet (i.e. approximately
65 vessels)). This study uses the data between the years 1997
and 2005 as variable input and to form a reference mode for
the simulation model. From 2005 onward, all variable input
data were kept constant at the 2005 level.
3 Results
In evaluating the explanatory power of a simulation model,
the fit between the simulated data (baseline) and the histori-
cal data (reference mode) needs to be investigated. Since this
study opts for a comprehensible model above a comprehen-
sive model, the goodness-of-fit-statistics are quite poor (e.g.
the R-square for average gross operating profit per vessel is
0.36). Nevertheless, Figure 4 illustrates that the graphs of the
simulated data and the reference mode for average gross oper-
ating profit per vessel have the same basic behaviour, though
the simulated data is systematically located below the histor-
ical data. This systematic fault is mainly because not all the
Fig. 4. The average gross operating profit per vessel (average
GOP/vessel) and the number of vessels in the Belgian fleet between
1997-2014 (baseline = simulation data (= black), reference mode =
historical data (= grey)).
Belgian fishing grounds with their total quota are included in
the model. Additionally, average gross operating profit per ves-
sel is a subtraction of revenues per vessel and operational costs
per vessel, which are often both large figures in Belgian fish-
eries. Such calculation results in a small outcome easily sub-
ject to systematic under- or over-estimations.
Figure 4 also illustrates the fit between the simulated data
and reference mode for “number of vessels in the fleet”. Ini-
tially, the fit looks good but further inquiry into the individual
dynamics of the sub fleets indicates a rapid conversion of the
fleet which is only partly observed in reality (Fig. 5). This rapid
conversion is caused by the systematically underestimation of
average gross operating profit per vessel by the simulation
model. As a result, non-profitable fisheries go bankrupt faster
and “zero-profit fisheries” (Salz 2006) become non-profitable
fisheries going bankrupt as well. Consequently, these bankrupt
vessels exit the fleet, leaving fewer vessels with the residual
amount of total quota. These remaining vessels will have a
better opportunity for increasing their revenues and therefore
increase their future investment potential. However, this expla-
nation only contains an explanatory power when total quota
are common pool resources and under the “ceteris paribus”
clause. In conclusion, the simulation output is plausible taking
into account the focus on the comprehensibility of the simula-
tion model and the aim of the paper.
3.1 Sensitivity simulation on the number of maximum
fishing days
The restrictive policy instrument of maximum fishing days
influences fleet performance and dynamics by aﬀecting the
fishing tactics of fishermen (i.e. the boolean variable Zsg for
(s, g) in Eq. (1)). Two multivariate sensitivity analyses (each
containing 1000 runs) were run to unveil the eﬀect of changes
of maximum 10% in maximum fishing days on fleet perfor-
mance and dynamics (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). The
four parameters under sensitivity simulation (ndays,s for every
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Table 4. Overview of the scenarios used to test the eﬀect of restrictive policy instruments on fleet performance and dynamics. Type of variables:
constant; Strength of the sensitivity simulations: 10%; distribution function for the sensitivity simulations: random uniform.
Type of Number of Variable Array of the variable Initial Minimum Maximum
sensitivity runs in the under value of value for the value for the
simulation sensitivity sensitivity the sensitivity sensitivity
simulation simulation variable simulation simulation
Scenario 1 Multivariate 1000 Maximum fishing days Eurocutter 200 180 200
Large beam trawler 250 225 250
Set netter 140 126 140
Shrimp trawler 200 180 200
Scenario 2 Multivariate 1000 Maximum fishing days Eurocutter 200 200 220
Large beam trawler 250 250 275
Set netter 140 140 154
Shrimp trawler 200 200 220
Scenario 3 Multivariate 1000 Total quota IV bc 14 156 674 12 741 007 14 156 674
VII de 3 555 241 3 199 717 3 555 241
VII fg 2 350 407 2 115 367 2 350 407
Scenario 4 Multivariate 1000 Total quota IV bc 14 156 674 14 156 674 15 572 342
VII de 3 555 241 3 555 241 3 910 765
VII fg 2 350 407 2 350 407 2 585 448
Scenario 5 Univariate 1000 Licences (None) 110 99 110
Scenario 6 Univariate 1000 Licences (None) 110 110 121
Fig. 5. Number of vessels per sub fleet between 1997-2014 (= simu-
lated data).
(s)) were simultaneously and randomly varied between their
maximum and minimum values (Table 4).
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of decreasing the number
of maximum fishing days on average gross operating profit
per vessel and total fleet size. When the mean value of aver-
age gross operating profit per vessel and total fleet size from
the sensitivity simulation are compared with the values from
the baseline, some small negative eﬀect on future fleet perfor-
mance and dynamics can be observed. By 2015, average gross
operating profit per vessel will be 9.6% lower compared to the
baseline.
In contrast, the outer bounds of the 95% confidence in-
tervals also indicate the chance of a positive impact on aver-
age gross operating profit per vessel. This is counterintuitive
and can be explained when vessels exit the fleet, since a de-
cline in maximum fishing days caused them to go bankrupt.
Fig. 6. The eﬀect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10%
decrease and increase in maximum fishing days per sub fleet on the
average gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels
in the Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease,
“I” = Increase, and “B” = Baseline).
Consequently, a smaller fleet is left with the same amount of
total quota. Even with less fishing days, some sub fleets can
succeed in catching more fish because now they have the pos-
sibility to catch a larger proportion of the total quota. As a
result of equation (5), more catch leads to more revenues and
therefore increases average gross operating profit per vessel for
these sub fleets (Eq. (4)). This increase in average gross operat-
ing profit per vessel can result in a general increase in average
gross operating profit for a vessel of the total fleet. However,
this explanation is only valid when total quota are common
pool resources and given the “ceteris paribus” clause.
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Fig. 7. The eﬀect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10%
decrease and increase in maximum fishing days per sub fleet on the
number of vessels per Belgian sub fleet between 1997 and 2015
(where: “D” = Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “.......” = Baseline).
Figure 7 illustrates the impact a decrease in maximum fish-
ing days has on sub fleet dynamics. Compared to the baseline,
most sub fleets have no immediate dramatic changes in fleet
size. Only large beam trawlers have a large 95% confidence
interval. As a result, they are the sub fleet whose size is the
most sensitive to changes in maximum fishing days.
If the number of maximum fishing days per sub fleet in-
creases, both the average gross operating profit per vessel and
total Belgian fleet size generated by the sensitivity simula-
tion slightly decreases in the long term (approximately –5%)
(Fig. 6). Further inquiry on the sub fleet level indicates that
on average no sub fleet significantly increases due to the ad-
ditional maximum fishing days (Fig. 7). In contrast, the sub
fleet of the large beam trawlers even decreases. This coun-
terintuitive behaviour is caused mainly by the fishing tactical
decision rule (Eq. (1)). The rule sends the sub fleets to the
fishing ground with the highest catch per unit of eﬀort, not
taking into account the amount of fuel necessary to steam to-
ward this “best” fishing ground. With the high fuel prices in
the model (and in reality), this behaviour can lead to financial
losses on trip level resulting in declining average gross operat-
ing profit per vessel. If sub fleets are given more fishing days,
this decision rule sends fishermen to these further located fish-
ing grounds more often. Consequently, these extra trips can
result in financial losses on trip level leading to a decrease in
average gross operating profit. Although this decision rule is
artificial, many fishermen act in similar ways. Giving them ex-
tra fishing days will result in more time spent at sea without
performing a decent cost-benefit analysis.
3.2 Sensitivity simulation on the amount of total quota
Total quota regulations restrict the amount of fish the
fleet is allowed to land during a certain time frame. In Bel-
gium, each fishing ground has its own total quota. Therefore,
Fig. 8. The eﬀect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10%
decrease and increase in total quota per fishing ground on the aver-
age gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the
Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, “I” =
Increase, and “B” = Baseline).
changing these amounts of total quota aﬀects the fishing tac-
tics of fishermen (Eq. (1)). Two similar multivariate sensitiv-
ity simulations as for maximum fishing days are performed to
analyse the eﬀect of changes of maximum 10% of the amount
of total quota on fleet performance and dynamics. These sensi-
tivity simulations have three parameters under sensitivity: Qg
for every (g) (Table 4).
When the amounts of total quota are decreased, the mean
value of average gross operating profit per vessel from the sen-
sitivity simulation is situated below the baseline until the end
of 2012 (Fig. 8). This gap was at its maximum in 2007 at 9.2%.
From 2013 onward, this mean value started to exceed the base-
line. In 2015, this gap reaches 24%. The average value for
the number of vessels in the fleet shows a similar behaviour.
Consequently, decreasing the amounts of total quota on fish-
ing grounds can result in a better performing fleet in the long
run without further harming its size.
This outcome is not expected and therefore counterintu-
itive. This behaviour is caused mainly by two mechanisms.
First, large beam trawlers leave the business a bit faster com-
pared to the baseline (Fig. 9) resulting in a smaller fleet which
is left earlier with the same amount of total quota leading to
an increased average gross operating profit per vessel (as ear-
lier explained). Second, if total quota on fishing grounds far oﬀ
shore are lowered, these quota can be exploited with less trips,
often resulting in financial losses. Subsequently, their negative
impact on gross operating profit per vessel of the fleet will be
more limited (as earlier explained).
The fleet dynamics on sub fleet level indicate on average
a faster decline in the number of large beam trawlers due to
a decrease in total quota (Fig. 9). In the long run, this de-
cline is beneficial for the number of eurocutters, since both
sub fleets compete for quota on the same fishing grounds. The
other two sub fleets show no immediate major changes in fleet
size compared to the baseline.
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Fig. 9. The eﬀect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10%
decrease and increase in total quota per fishing ground on the number
of vessels per Belgian sub fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D”
= Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “.......” = Baseline).
When the amount of total quota increases (maximum
10%), the average gross operating profit per vessel almost
certainly slightly increases (Fig. 8). This is translated into a
slower decrease in total fleet size. In the long run, there is even
room for a fleet recovery (indicated by the upper boundary of
the 95% confidence interval). This possible fleet recovery is
due to a slower decline in the number of large beam trawlers
(also broad confidence intervals) combined with the increase
in shrimp trawlers (Fig. 9).
3.3 Sensitivity simulation on the number of licences
This restrictive policy instrument limits the total fleet size
by influencing (Eq. (10)) of the investment decision rule. The
eﬀect of changes of maximum 10% in the number of licenses
on fleet performance and dynamics is tested by two univariate
sensitivity analyses (1000 runs). The parameter under sensitiv-
ity is nlic (Table 4).
The eﬀect of decreasing the number of licences on the av-
erage gross operating profit per vessel is small (on average
±3% deviation compared to the baseline) with exception of
2014 (deviation of +11.9%) (Fig. 10). The same conclusions
can be drawn for the total fleet size. However, the small change
in total fleet size houses an interesting finding at the sub fleet
level. The decline in the number of licences delays the growth
of the shrimp trawler fleet (Fig. 11). More generally speak-
ing, if a sub fleet is profitable, its fleet size can only grow as
long as licences are available (Eq. (10)). As a result, the pro-
tective power of licences also blocks the growth of successful
sub fleets.
Average gross operating profit per vessel, the total fleet
size and the sub fleet sizes are not aﬀected by an increase
in the number of licences because it has no direct impact on
fleet performance given the scope of our model. Consequently,
increasing the number of licenses when the total fleet size is
continuously decreasing has obviously no impact on future
fleet performance and dynamics.
Fig. 10. The eﬀect of a sensitivity simulation implying a maximum
10% decrease in licences on the average gross operation profit per
vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian fleet between 1997
and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, and “B” = Baseline).
Fig. 11. The eﬀect of a sensitivity simulation implying a maximum
10% decrease in licences on the number of vessels per Belgian sub
fleets between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, and “.......” =
Baseline).
4 Discussion
This study shows that the eﬀect of restrictive policy in-
struments on fishing fleet dynamics is not uniform. A distinc-
tion needs to be made between restrictive policy instruments
aﬀecting the fishing tactical decisions and those aﬀecting the
investment decisions. For the Belgian case, changes in maxi-
mum fishing days and total quota result in larger changes in
fleet performance and dynamics compared to changes in li-
cences. Furthermore, changes in the first category have a di-
rect impact on fleet performance, though not always as ex-
pected. Licences only aﬀect fleet performance indirectly since
they limit the entry of new vessels to the fleet on the one hand
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and they often block the growth of successful sub fleets on the
other.
A constantly returning observation was counterintuitive
behaviour of fleet performance and dynamics due to cer-
tain policy changes. This counterintuitive behaviour is partly
caused by “misperception of feedback” (Sterman 1989; Diehl
and Sterman 1995). “Misperception of feedback” is often ob-
served in managing natural resources (Moxnes 1998ab) and
occurs when a system is dynamically complex (Senge 1990).
In Belgium, as in many other countries, the “system” of man-
aging fisheries is dynamically complex because it consists of
many interactions between reinforcing and balancing feedback
loops. Consequently, changing the strength of restrictive pol-
icy instruments can result in a counterintuitive outcome.
Next, the results must be translated into practical sug-
gestions for policy makers to improve fisheries management.
Since this study is a basic study and further research on this
topic is needed for the Belgian case, the practical suggestion
will be general guidelines in the usage of restrictive policy in-
struments. Most importantly, policy makers need to be aware
of misperceptions of feedback when changes are made in re-
strictive policy instruments. Therefore, further research will
try to introduce our simulation model in the group of Belgian
policy makers making them (more) aware of these counterin-
tuitive eﬀects. Second, the results show that altering only one
type of restrictive policy instrument often will not result in the
desired output, or will simply be inappropriate (e.g. increasing
the number of maximum fishing days when total quota are al-
ready fully exploited). Therefore, policy makers need to find
a balance in combining policy instruments. Finally, when in-
creased fleet performance is the aim for future fisheries man-
agement, the authors’ advice for the short term (and taking
into account the scope of the model) is to convert the total fleet
toward a smaller and more profitable fleet. This study proved
that the restrictive policy instruments that aﬀect the fishing tac-
tics of fishermen are most suitable in meeting this objective.
The authors prefer to decrease the maximum fishing days for
every sub fleet by the same substantial percentage, resulting in
highly unproductive large beam trawlers exiting the fleet, leav-
ing more room for productive vessels to enhance profitability.
If necessary, total quotas can be slightly increased to compen-
sate for the loss in fishing days. The highly productive sub
fleets will benefit from this policy. As a result, the fleet will be
profitable, making future investment an option again.
This brings us to the discussion of the future value of re-
strictive policy instruments. Since fisheries management sci-
ence has broadened its scope from a purely biological (Russell
1931; Graham 1935) over a bioeconomic (Gordon 1953, 1954;
Scott 1955; Crutchfield 1956, 1959) to finally a political biore-
gunomics approach (Walters 1980; Anderson 1987), many
studies have questioned the future value of restrictive policies
(Barber 1988; Larkin 1996; Ruseski 1998; Boude et al. 2001;
Polet et al. 2006). Anderson (1985: 409) even states that “the
general conclusion of this literature is that traditional man-
agement techniques such as closed seasons, closed areas, gear
restrictions, and total quotas are economically ineﬃcient”. The
reason why restrictive policies are still commonly used lies in
their power to preserve a “status quo” in fleet performance and
dynamics. They serve the unwritten objective of preserving
social peace. Boude et al. (2001) come to this same conclu-
sion for the whole Common Fisheries Policy.
In Belgium, the key to social peace lies in preserving the
(large) beam trawler fleet. For decades, this fishing method was
highly profitable. However, with the recent and rapid changes
in the fisheries environment (e.g. stock decline, changing catch
per unit of eﬀort and rising fuel prices), (restrictive) policies
were put into place protecting these fisheries (e.g. more quota
for larger vessels). Nevertheless, reality has shown that these
policies cannot protect the beam trawler fleet any longer (e.g.:
Stouten et al. (2007) indicates that the current and future rises
in fuel prices result in beam trawlers going bankrupt even with
these protective policies in place). Therefore, the time is right
to break with the unwritten policy of preserving social peace.
Policy makers should shift policies and stimulate a conversion
towards a more profitable fleet. The solution might perhaps lie
in a more diverse fleet consisting of diﬀerent fishing methods
and diﬀerent vessel scales. The future value of restrictive pol-
icy instruments is to contribute to this conversion. However,
traditions will need to be overcome and the restrictive policy
instruments probably will need to be reengineered.
5 Conclusion
This paper evaluated the eﬀect of changes in three restric-
tive policy instruments, respectively, maximum fishing days,
total quota restrictions and licences on future fleet performance
and dynamics. The used methodology of system dynamics and
sensitivity simulation has proven to be very eﬃcient in unveil-
ing these eﬀects.
The results indicated that changes in maximum fishing
days and total quota resulted in higher fluctuations in fleet per-
formance and dynamics compared to changes in licences. Ad-
ditionally, changes in the first category had a direct impact on
fleet performance, though not always as expected, whereas li-
cences only aﬀected fleet performance indirectly.
Although the eﬀect of restrictive policy instruments on
fishing fleet dynamics was not uniform, a constantly returning
observation was counterintuitive behaviour partly caused by
misperception of feedback. Being aware of this phenomenon
is perhaps the most important recommendation for policy mak-
ers resulting from this paper. Also important was that the re-
sults proved that altering only one type of restrictive policy
instruments at a time often fails to meet desired outcomes.
Therefore, policy makers need to find a balance in combining
policy instruments. In addition, this paper opened the discus-
sion for rethinking the use of restrictive policy instruments in
our rapidly changing, complex and uncertain fisheries environ-
ment. In Belgium, these policy instruments are currently aimed
at “preserving the status quo and social peace”. In the future,
they should be used as a driving factor in “stimulating fleet
dynamics”. This opens a lot of further research opportunities.
Our further research will focus on two dimensions. First,
research needs to be done to determine what kind of conver-
sion is beneficial for the Belgian fleet and how to get there
given certain policy instruments. Second, how can our simu-
lation model change the thoughts of Belgian policy makers to
fully back such a conversion?
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Appendix. Input data needed to run the baseline of the simulation model.
Variable Array Value type 
in the 
model
Initial value 
in the model 
(mean value 
year 1997)
Unit of 
measurement
Real
or
proxy
Data
source
*
Descriptive statistics 
(1997-2005)
Maximum
fishing days
Eurocutter Constant 200 day/vessel Proxy ILVO
Large beam trawler Constant 250 day/vessel Proxy ILVO
Set netter Constant 140 day/vessel Proxy ILVO
Shrimp trawler Constant 200 day/vessel Proxy ILVO
Total quota IV bc Constant 14 156 674 kg Real SF Mean: 14 156 674
Max: 16 952 000 – Min: 11 
238 500
St dev: 1 972 497
VII de Constant 3 555 241 kg Real SF Mean: 3 555 241
Max: 4 219 000 – Min: 2860
000
St dev: 353 225
VII fg Constant 2 350 407 kg Real SF Mean: 2 350 407
Max: 3 079 500 – Min: 1891
000
St dev: 423 173
Licences (None) Constant 110 license Proxy ILVO
Fish price (None) Time series 3.52 euro/kg Real SF Mean: 3.67
Max: 4.07 – Min: 3.39
St dev: 0.22
Fuel price (None) Time series 0.19 euro/litre Real SF Mean: 0.26
Max: 0.43 – Min: 0.16
St dev: 0.08
Price for a 
new vessel
Eurocutter Constant 2 100 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Large beam trawler Constant 5 000 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Set netter Constant 1 000 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Shrimp trawler Constant 2 100 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Demolition
price
(subsidies)
Eurocutter Constant 500 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Large beam trawler Constant 1 000 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Set netter Constant 300 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Shrimp trawler Constant 500 000 euro Proxy ILVO
Distance to 
fishing
ground
IV bc Constant 150 km Proxy ILVO
VII de Constant 350 km Proxy ILVO
VII fg Constant 700 km Proxy ILVO
Number of 
vessels
Eurocutter Variable 42 vessel Real ILVO Mean: 32.7
Max: 42 – Min: 29
St dev: 4.1
Large beam trawler Variable 49 vessel Real ILVO Mean: 52.8
Max: 56 – Min: 49
St dev: 2.6
Set netter Variable 1 vessel Real ILVO Mean: 2.6
Max: 4 – Min: 1
St dev: 1.0
Shrimp trawler Variable 16 vessel Real ILVO Mean: 14.9
Max: 16 – Min: 14
St dev: 0.8
Variable
costs
Eurocutter Time series 7181 euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 7983
Max: 9191 – Min: 7089
St dev: 745
Large beam trawler Time series 16 570 euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 16 644
Max: 17 270 – Min:15 550
St dev: 597
Set netter Time series 2779 euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 4703
Max: 8181 – Min: 2779
St dev: 1566
Shrimp trawler Time series 2027 euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 2904
Max: 4357 – Min: 1674
St dev: 944
Fixed costs Eurocutter Time series 1049 euro/week Real SF Mean: 1101
Max: 1222 – Min: 895
St dev: 102
Large beam trawler Time series 2673 euro/week Real SF Mean: 2669
Max: 2871 – Min: 2529
St dev: 108
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Appendix. Continued.
Variable Array Value type 
in the 
model
Initial value 
in the model 
(mean value 
year 1997)
Unit of 
measurement
Real
or
proxy
Data
source
*
Descriptive statistics 
(1997-2005)
Set netter Time series 299 euro/week Real SF Mean: 362
Max: 536 – Min: 299
St dev: 96
Shrimp trawler Time series 427 euro/week Real SF Mean: 588
Max: 860 – Min: 427
St dev: 130
Debts Eurocutter Constant 62 190 914 euro Proxy ILVO
Large beam trawler Constant 184 830 374 euro Proxy ILVO
Set netter Constant 4 508 181 euro Proxy ILVO
Shrimp trawler Constant 1 371 393 euro Proxy ILVO
Productivity
rate
Eurocutter
IV bc
Time series 5169 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 4482
Max: 5221 – Min: 3695
St dev: 556
Eurocutter
VII de
Time series 3718 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 5043
Max: 6105 – Min: 3718
St dev: 655
Eurocutter
VII fg
Time series 3168 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 3313
Max: 4277 – Min: 2688
St dev: 455
Large beam trawler
IV bc
Time series 12 102 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 11 132
Max: 12 820 – Min: 9300
St dev: 1062
Large beam trawler
VII de
Time series 9422 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 10 320
Max: 11 223 – Min: 9422
St dev: 550
Large beam trawler
VII fg
Time series 7767 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 7171
Max: 8469 – Min: 6203
St dev: 744
Set netter
IV bc
Time series 1959 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 1809
Max: 2295 – Min: 922
St dev: 438
Set netter
VII de
Time series 1575 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 2664
Max: 5087 – Min: 1575
St dev: 1043
Set netter
VII fg
Time series 0 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 0
Max: 0 – Min: 0
St dev: 0
Shrimp trawler
IV bc
Time series 1850 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 2836
Max: 5263 – Min: 1281
St dev: 1352
Shrimp trawler
VII de
Time series 922 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 1194
Max: 2654 – Min: 0
St dev: 1023
Shrimp trawler
VII fg
Time series 0 kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 505
Max: 2925 – Min: 0
St dev: 1054
* Data source: (i) Belgian Sea Fisheries Service = “SF”,  (ii) Internal data from the Institute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research = “ILVO ”.
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